地政学を英国で学んだ

インド洋の地政学 by カプラン

いつかは書いてくれると思いましたが、やはり書いてくれました。

ややリベラル寄りのアトランティック誌の中で安全保障関連で鋭い記事を書くロバート・カプランが、とうとうフォーリンアフェアーズ誌に地政学バリバリの論文を書いてくれました。

「インド洋は地理的な存在であると同時にアイディアそのものである」という言葉にはしびれました（笑

以前からインド洋について彼は短い論文をいろんなところで発表していたんですが、まさかFAにまとまったものを出すとは。

これをまとめた本をはやく読みたいものです。

＝＝＝＝
Center Stage for the Twenty-first Century
Power Plays in the Indian Ocean

Robert D. Kaplan
From Foreign Affairs, March/April 2009

The greater Indian Ocean region encompasses the entire arc of Islam, from the Sahara Desert to the Indonesian archipelago. Although the Arabs and the Persians are known to Westerners primarily as desert peoples, they have also been great seafarers. In the Middle Ages, they sailed from Arabia to China; proselytizing along the way, they spread their faith through sea-based commerce. Today, the western reaches of the Indian Ocean include the tinderboxes of Somalia, Yemen, Iran, and Pakistan -- constituting a network of dynamic trade as well as a network of global terrorism, piracy, and drug smuggling. Hundreds of millions of Muslims -- the legacy of those medieval conversions -- live along the Indian Ocean's eastern edges, in India and Bangladesh, Malaysia and Indonesia.

The Indian Ocean is dominated by two immense bays, the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal, near the top of which are two of the least stable countries in the world: Pakistan and Myanmar (also known as Burma). State collapse or regime change in Pakistan would affect its neighbors by empowering Baluchi and Sindhi separatists seeking closer links to India and Iran. Likewise, the collapse of the junta in Myanmar -- where competition over energy and natural resources between China and India looms -- would threaten economies nearby and require a massive seaborne humanitarian intervention. On the other hand, the advent of a more liberal regime in Myanmar would undermine China's dominant position there, boost Indian influence, and quicken regional economic integration.

In other words, more than just a geographic feature, the Indian Ocean is also an idea

＝＝＝＝＝

この論文はさっそく友人達にまわします（笑

オバマ政権の国防費について

いやー、ひさしぶりの更新です。

オバマ政権の国防費について、ローレンス・コルブが良くまとまっている分析記事を書いておりました。

私は先生に「戦略とは予算のことだ」と習いましたが、たしかに今回の国防費の内訳は見物です。

＝＝＝

Obama’s Defense Budget Is on Target

By Lawrence J. Korb | February 26, 2009

Specific budget recommendations

President Barack Obama’s topline budget projections for fiscal year 2010 allocate $534 billion to the Department of Defense, the largest allocation of any department. The amount represents roughly a 4-percent increase over the $513 billion allocated to the Pentagon in FY2009 under the Bush administration, and $6.7 billion more than the outgoing administration’s projections for FY 2010.

Supporters of a vastly increased defense budget, including many who support the Pentagon’s internal request for $584 billion for FY2010, have argued that Obama’s baseline represents a budget cut in a time of war. They contend that this so-called reduction will unnerve our allies, embolden our enemies and, by ending programs like the F-22 Raptor and slowing down programs like the F-35 and Future Combat Systems, will not only weaken defense but hurt our economy. Objective analysis reveals that these arguments are without merit.

The defense budget has nearly doubled in real terms in the last decade, and this year’s $534 billion baseline provides adequate funding to maintain the quality of our troops and military infrastructure, and modernize the force. This amount does not in any way undermine the war effort, as the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are financed in separate supplementals, which to date total nearly $1 trillion. Obama has promised $130 billion more for these efforts in FY2010.

Nor will this level of funding unnerve our allies or embolden our enemies. Adding the supplementals for the war to the regular budget will bring total defense spending to about $700 billion for FY2010, more in real terms than at anytime since World War II, and more than what the rest of the world combined spends on defense.

The FY2010 budget offers two necessary changes from past Bush administration budgets. First, Obama will reportedly hold the defense budget flat at FY2010 levels over the next 10 years, adjusting only for inflation. The Center for American Progress made a similar recommendation in “Building a Military for the 21st Century: New Realities, New Priorities,” which in December 2008 argued that the current sum of $534 billion:

“If used wisely, is more than enough to ensure American military predominance while recapitalizing equipment lost in Iraq and Afghanistan, and growing and modernizing the force. The next administration should therefore keep the defense budget flat over the next four years, adjusting for inflation and fluctuations in the U.S. dollar.”

Second, after over seven years of war in Afghanistan and nearly six years in Iraq, the Obama administration’s budget will include the cost of the two wars for the first time. Under the Bush administration, the cost of the wars—currently totaling $657 billion for Iraq and $173 billion for Afghanistan[1]—was appropriated through emergency supplementals, a process that allowed the services to take advantage of war-funding bills to request money for significant non-war-related projects, such as additional F-22 Raptors, that should have been included in the DOD’s baseline budget. CAP advocated reforming the process:

“DOD should in the future submit appropriations for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan with the baseline request in one consolidated budget. This procedure will allow lawmakers to scrutinize the items from the supplemental and force Congress and DOD leaders to make trade-offs and hard choices when considering the FY2010-13 defense budget priorities.”

The Center for American Progress is encouraged that the Obama administration has adopted a similar stance.

＝＝＝


日本の年間国家予算よりやや少ない額が国防費についやされている事実を見ても、その影響力を分析することは大切になってきますよね。

上の分析によると、ブッシュ政権の時との違いは、１、２０１０年レベルを今後十年間維持する、２、二つの戦争にかかる費用を補正予算ではなく正式予算にまとめて組み込む、ということみたいです。

しかしオバマでも国防費はブッシュの頃と全く変えることができないんですなぁ。実質的に４％の増加の６６３７億ドルで、それに色々余計なものがついて合計７千億ドルですから（苦笑

ロボットと戦争の倫理（インタビュー）

例のピーター・シンガーのインタビューがありました。私の周辺の戦略学仲間の間では、この本についてかなり話題になっております。



"Wired for War: The Robotics Revolution and Conflict in the 21st Century”

The US has carried out thirty drone attacks on alleged al-Qaeda targets inside Pakistani territory since last summer, killing an estimated 250 people. The Predator attacks highlight the US military’s increased use of unmanned aerial vehicles and other robotic devices on the battlefield. We speak to P.W. Singer, a former defense policy adviser to President Obama’s election campaign and author of Wired For War: The Robotics Revolution and Conflict in the 21st Century. [includes rush transcript]

近年の傭兵会社関連の有名な本（コーポレート・ウォーリアー）を出している人ですね。私も発売当初に買いました。この人はオバマ政権の移行チームでもアドバイザーをやっていたんですね。

このインタビューの最初の部分だけでも非常に面白い発言が（笑

＝＝＝

AMY GOODMAN: Let’s start with Pakistan. Explain what these unmanned drones are.

P.W. SINGER: Well, you’re talking about systems that can be flown remotely. So, the planes, these Predator drones, are taking off from places in, for example, Afghanistan, but the pilots are physically sitting in bases in Nevada. And there, you have incredible capabilities. They can see from a great distance. They can stay in the air for twenty-four hours. And so, they’re very valuable in going after these insurgent and terrorist hide sites, which is in, you know, mountainous terrain, and it would be difficult to get US troops in.

But the flipside is that there’s a question of what’s the message that we think we are sending with these systems versus the message that’s being received on the ground, in terms of the broader war of ideas.

AMY GOODMAN: What do you mean?

P.W. SINGER: Well, so, I spent the last several years going around trying to meet with everyone engaged in this robotics revolution, everything from the scientists behind it to the science fiction authors influencing them, to the drone pilots, to the four-star generals, but also went out and interviewed people in the region.

And this question of messaging, one of the people that I met with was a senior Bush administration official, and he said, “The unmanning of war plays to our strength. The thing that scares people is our technology.” But that’s very different when you go meet with someone, for example, in Lebanon. One of the people that I met with for the book was an editor of a leading newspaper there. And he had to say that basically this shows that you are cowardly, that you are not man enough to come fight us. So a disconnect between message we think we’re sending versus message that’s being received.

Or another illustration of this would be, there was a popular music—one of the hit songs in Pakistan last year talked about how the Americans look at us like insects. Shows you how it’s permeating pop culture. So you have this balancing

＝＝＝

アメリカ側はテクノロジーを使うことによって「これは俺たちの強みだ！俺たちの優れたテクノロジーで奴らは恐怖を感じている！」と考えているらしいですが、逆に地上で爆撃される方は「アメリカは卑怯で正々堂々としてない。やるならここまで来て勝負せんかい！」と言っているということですね。

しかも去年にパキスタンで流行した歌の中の一つに「アメリカ人は俺たちを虫けらのようにしか見ていない」というものがあったとのこと。

テクノロジーに対する感覚の違い、そして「戦士」の文化の違いなどが出てて面白い。

レポーターの反乱

アメリカの経済関係者の間で話題になっている動画です



CNBCのフロアリポーターであるリック・サンテリが、オバマの救済案に本番中に大反対してしてました。

「なんで俺の稼いだ金で、となりの奴の借金を肩代わりしなきゃならんのだ？」という民衆の怒りがよく表現されております。これこそポピュリズム（笑

ちなみにACORNという民主党系の左翼団体は「差し押さえと戦う戦士」という名の下に、集団で銀行の差し押さえを組織的に（力づくで）防ぐという運動をやっているそうです。

こうなるとアメリカ国内の治安の悪化が・・・あるでしょうねぇ。

キルギス側からの視点

アメリカは中央アジアに足がかりを失ったわけですが、キルギス側の知識人がこれをどう見ているのかという意見の解説はなかなかありません。

そういう中で以下の論文は貴重です。まあこの人も大使をやっていたのでかなりプロ・アメリカな視点を持っていることは間違いないんですが（苦笑

＝＝＝＝

Last Flight Out of Kyrgyzstan

How the U.S. Lost a Vital Air Base

By Baktybek Abdrisaev
Friday, February 20, 2009; Page A23

For two weeks, the U.S. struggle to hold on to its last air base in Central Asia has made headlines, and the vote in Kyrgyzstan's parliament yesterday to close Manas Air Base will spark still more coverage. Analysts have rushed to portray this as a new chess match between a resurgent Russian Federation and a recalibrating United States; just as a new American president seeks to bolster the U.S. presence in Afghanistan, the principal land corridor from Pakistan is severed through a bridge bombing and the likely air base closure threatens the Obama administration's plan. The oversimplified but oft-repeated explanation is that Kremlin pressure is the source of Washington's predicament.

Having served as Kyrgyzstan's ambassador to the United States from 1996 to 2005, I know a great deal about the establishment of the base and the struggle to keep it open. It's true that our friends in Moscow were never happy that the base was opened and that they have exerted pressure to close it. But a nation's decision to offer a friend territory for military purposes involves a number of complex considerations. A base agreement rests on the shared interests of the host and the country that sends troops or supplies through it. When the base was opened in 2001, my nation was moved by several factors: Kyrgyz were deeply touched and saddened by the events of Sept. 11, and we were intent on showing support for our American friends. Moreover, we shared a common foe and a common pain: Fifty of our uniformed servicemen had been killed from 1999 to 2001 in gun battles with the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, an organization that formally allied itself with al-Qaeda and that operated out of bases in Afghanistan it maintained with al-Qaeda and Taliban support. The U.S. commitment to end those operations corresponded with the national security interests of my country. Kyrgyzstan also hoped to benefit economically from the base, a wish that was never hidden.

（中略）

Every relationship has its peaks and valleys. But one thing has consistently troubled me about the relationship between the United States and my country. Once the base was set up, I saw a fairly radical change in American attitudes. Before, Washington had consistently juggled a series of priorities -- broadly speaking, they were security concerns, economic concerns, and advocacy of human rights and democracy. But once the base was established, it became clear that while other concerns might be voiced from time to time, only one thing really mattered: the air base. In the end, this shift served neither country's interests.

＝＝＝＝

この彼は「一旦基地ができたあとは、議論が基地だけに集中してしまった」と言ってますねぇ。まあお金の問題もあるんでしょうが・・・・

沖縄撤退後（？）のシナリオを考える際には一応この辺はケーススタディとして注目しておいたほうがよさそうな気が。