2009年 03月 13日
認めたバーナンキ |
バーナンキがCFRで発表したスピーチの中でアメリカが海外から恒常的に金を借りすぎていることをとうとう認めました。
＝＝＝
A Conversation with Ben S. Bernanke
（中略）
BEN S. BERNANKE: Thank you very much, David. And good morning, everybody.
The world is suffering through the worst financial crisis since the 1930s, a crisis that has precipitated a sharp downturn in the global economy. Its fundamental causes remain in dispute. In my view, however, it is impossible to understand the crisis without reference to the global imbalances in trade and capital flows that began in the latter half of the 1990s.
In simplest terms, these imbalances reflected a chronic lack of saving relative to investments in the United States and some other industrial countries, combined with an extraordinary increase in saving relative to investment in many emerging market nations. The increase in excess saving in the emerging world resulted in turn from factors such as rapid economic growth in high-saving East Asian economies, accompanied outside of China by reduced investment rates; large buildups in foreign exchange reserves in a number of emerging markets; and substantial increases in revenues received by exporters of oil and other commodities.
Like water seeking its level, saving flowed from where it was abundant to where it was deficient, with the result that the United States and some other advanced countries experienced large capital inflows for more than a decade, even as real long-term interest rates remained low.
The global imbalances were the joint responsibility of the United States and our trading partners, and although the topic was a perennial one at international conferences, we collectively did not do enough to reduce those imbalances. However, the responsibility to use the resulting capital inflows effectively fell primarily on the receiving countries, particularly the United States.
The details of this story are complex, but broadly speaking, the risk management systems of the private sector and government oversight of the financial sector in the United States and some other industrial countries failed to ensure that the in-rush of capital was prudently invested, a failure that has led to a powerful reversal in investor sentiment and a seizing-up of credit markets.
（中略）
Today, I would like to talk about four key elements of such a strategy. First, we must address the problem of financial institutions that are deemed too big, or perhaps too interconnected, to fail.
Second, we must strengthen what I will call the financial infrastructure -- the systems, rules, and conventions that govern trading, payment, clearing and settlement in financial markets -- to ensure that it will perform well under stress.
Third, we should review regulatory policies and accounting rules to ensure that they do not induce excessive pro-cyclicality, that is, they do not overly magnify the ups and downs in the financial system and in the economy.
And finally, we should consider whether the creation of an authority specifically charged with monitoring and addressing systemic risks would help protect the system from financial crises like the one we are currently experiencing.
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新しい金融監督機関を作ることを提案しておりますね。暗にグリーンスパンを批判しているともとれます。
"The global imbalances”というのはもちろん国際経済用語ですが、国際関係論の勢力均衡（BOP）と絡めても考えてもけっこう面白い概念です。
そういやイギリスも１９世紀末にはアメリカと同じように海外に対する借金が増えてました。帝国は金（と労働力＝奴隷）を借りなければならないというのはいつの時代でも共通していることなんでしょうか？
＝＝＝
A Conversation with Ben S. Bernanke
（中略）
BEN S. BERNANKE: Thank you very much, David. And good morning, everybody.
The world is suffering through the worst financial crisis since the 1930s, a crisis that has precipitated a sharp downturn in the global economy. Its fundamental causes remain in dispute. In my view, however, it is impossible to understand the crisis without reference to the global imbalances in trade and capital flows that began in the latter half of the 1990s.
In simplest terms, these imbalances reflected a chronic lack of saving relative to investments in the United States and some other industrial countries, combined with an extraordinary increase in saving relative to investment in many emerging market nations. The increase in excess saving in the emerging world resulted in turn from factors such as rapid economic growth in high-saving East Asian economies, accompanied outside of China by reduced investment rates; large buildups in foreign exchange reserves in a number of emerging markets; and substantial increases in revenues received by exporters of oil and other commodities.
Like water seeking its level, saving flowed from where it was abundant to where it was deficient, with the result that the United States and some other advanced countries experienced large capital inflows for more than a decade, even as real long-term interest rates remained low.
The global imbalances were the joint responsibility of the United States and our trading partners, and although the topic was a perennial one at international conferences, we collectively did not do enough to reduce those imbalances. However, the responsibility to use the resulting capital inflows effectively fell primarily on the receiving countries, particularly the United States.
The details of this story are complex, but broadly speaking, the risk management systems of the private sector and government oversight of the financial sector in the United States and some other industrial countries failed to ensure that the in-rush of capital was prudently invested, a failure that has led to a powerful reversal in investor sentiment and a seizing-up of credit markets.
（中略）
Today, I would like to talk about four key elements of such a strategy. First, we must address the problem of financial institutions that are deemed too big, or perhaps too interconnected, to fail.
Second, we must strengthen what I will call the financial infrastructure -- the systems, rules, and conventions that govern trading, payment, clearing and settlement in financial markets -- to ensure that it will perform well under stress.
Third, we should review regulatory policies and accounting rules to ensure that they do not induce excessive pro-cyclicality, that is, they do not overly magnify the ups and downs in the financial system and in the economy.
And finally, we should consider whether the creation of an authority specifically charged with monitoring and addressing systemic risks would help protect the system from financial crises like the one we are currently experiencing.
＝＝＝＝
新しい金融監督機関を作ることを提案しておりますね。暗にグリーンスパンを批判しているともとれます。
"The global imbalances”というのはもちろん国際経済用語ですが、国際関係論の勢力均衡（BOP）と絡めても考えてもけっこう面白い概念です。
そういやイギリスも１９世紀末にはアメリカと同じように海外に対する借金が増えてました。帝国は金（と労働力＝奴隷）を借りなければならないというのはいつの時代でも共通していることなんでしょうか？
by masa_the_man
| 2009-03-13 02:38
| ニュース
